

発表題目 Propositions as Mental Event Types

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本文 The metaphysics and epistemology of propositions have gained increasing attention in recent years, and several competing accounts of propositions have been proposed. The goal of this paper is to critically examine an account of propositions proposed by Scott Soames (2010, 2014), according to which propositions are types whose tokens are mental events. I provide three considerations in favor of the account.

First, I discuss and undercut the criticism of the account presented by Caplan, et al. (2013), who claim that Soames's account fails to explain properties usually attributed to propositions. I reconstruct an argument by analogy from Soames's writings to sketch an explanation for why types of mental events can have propositional properties.

Second, I compare Soames's account with a different approach to the nature of propositions that views propositions as being essentially dependent on human natural language (King, 2007, among others). I argue that Soames's account, which considers propositions language-independent, does not suffer from problems arising from the grammar of natural language that plague the language-dependent approach.

Third, I examine the question of whether Soames's account is compatible with a Chomskyan internalist conception of linguistic meaning, which maintains that linguistic meanings must be internally specified, and that truth and reference are not directly associated with natural language expressions. If the answer to the question is positive, then the account could be construed as a genuinely naturalistic theory of propositions in the sense that it nicely fits with the sciences of the mind.

参考文献

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