

Tackling the Interface Problem

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Through this talk, I'll tell the audience the fact that the philosophy of action meets cognitive psychology and neuroscience of action. In order to do so, I'll tackle the interface problem. What is the interface problem? D. Davidsons theory of intention has flaws. Then, J. Searle divides intention into 'prior intention' and 'intention in action' (Searle 1983). However, Searle's theory of intention still has flaws. His theory of intention ignores non-propositional dimensions of action. Then, E. Pacherie adds to Searle's theory 'motor intention' whose content is non-propositional (Pacherie 2006). The idea of motor intention is inspired by neuroscience of action. However, there is a problem of how to interface propositional with non-propositional intentions. This problem is called 'the interface problem.' I'll try to solve this problem by invoking the discussion of whether the content of perception is conceptual.

References

- Pacherie, E. (2006), "Towards a dynamic theory of intentions," in Pockett, S., Banks W. P., & Gallagher, S., *Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Volition*, MIT Press, 145-167.
- Searle, J. (1983), *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press.